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t. Int rod uction 
A fundamental question in the theory of decision processes is whether decision 
rules (strategies) which depend only on the current state or only on the current time 
and state yield as high rewards as strategies which take the whole past into account. 
For many types of objective functions such as average reward payofIs, the first type 
of strategy (called stationary) is often much inferior to more general strategies, 
whereas for most common objective functions the second type (called Markov 
strategies) have been found to be as good as general strategies (cf. [I, 3, 5,7,8,10, 
II, 13, 14, 17,21]). 
The main purpose of this paper is to prove the existence of good Markov strategies 
for a large class of objective functions which includes product and lim inf payoffs 
as well as practically all of the classical dynamic programming expected payoff 
functions. One of the key new ideas is the use of a randomized Markov strategy 
which depends not only on a given non-randomized strategy, but on the (product) 
reward function as well, in contrast to the usual randomized Markov average which 
depends only on the original strategy (7, 8, II, 14, 19]. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section :2 contains the preliminary definitions 
and averaging results; Section 3 contains the definition of product-reward dependent 
randomized Markov strategies, and their application in establishing the existence 
of good randomized Markov strategies in a large class of objective functions 1V; 
Section 4 establishes the existence of good non-randomized Markov strategies in 
'11"'; and Section 5 establishes the existence of good (non-randomized) Markov 
strategies for the expected lim inf reward criterion. 
2. Countable-state decision processes and randomized strategies 
A countable-state decision process is a pair (X, r), where X is a countable set and 
r associates to each point x in X a non-empty collection rex) of probability 
measures on X. (In classical dynamic programming terminology, X represents the 
state space and rex) the actions available at x; in the gambling theory terminology 
of Dubins and Savage [6] (upon which most of the notation used in this paper is 
based), (X, r) is simply a gambling house with a countable number of fortunes and 
countably-additive gambles). A strategy is a function from the finite sequences in 
X (including the empty sequence "0") to the probability measures on X, and the 
same symbol. (T. will be used to denote both a strategy and the probability measurc 
it generates on the Borel product sigma-algebra ~ X' on X X' (X endowcd with the 
discrete topology). A strategy if in r at x is a strategy such that (T(H) E rex) and 
(T(X t , • ••• x,,) E 1'(x,,) for all XI." '. X" E X and all n ~ 1. A strategy (T is Markot' 
[10] if (T(.\"t ..... X,,)=(T(X; .... ,x;,) whenever x~=xn, and is Jtationary if 
(T(X I , . •. ,x,,) = (T(X; • .•. ,x;") whenever x;" =X". The conditional strategy given 
XI' ... , X"' (F[X t , .•• , x,,], is defined by 
(T[X I , •• . , xn](x;, ... , x;,,) =(T(X" •. . ,Xn, x;, . .. , x:,,). 
X" denotes the state of the process at time n and can be regarded as the 
nth-coordinate projection map on X'x,. Thus X" is a random variable on the 
probability space (X""", Be"", (F). In addition, S(x) denotes the Dirac delta measure 
at x, and fA the indicator function of the set A. 
Definition 2.1. The discrete randomized closure of I~ t, is the function 
i\X)={~ P,Y,:YiEI'(X),p,>o,f p,=t}.
j ~ I I ~ I 
Thus t ~ I: and in general the gambler has more strategies available in P than 
in I~ namely the "randomized averages" of his originally available strategies. One 
may think of constructing a strategy in t· by use of independent lotteries: when one 
is at state x, he may select the lottery (i.e. the {p;}) of his choice, and use that lottery 
to detcrmine which gamble in r(x) he selects (see the proof of Proposition 2.2). 
Clearly I"(x) is convex for all x, and in general is strictly larger than the convex 
hull of rex). 
The first proposition in this section says that every Markov strategy a in f may 
be expressed as an average (expected value) of Markov strategies in T. Aside from 
some notational differences, the proposition is similar to theorems of Krylov [14, 
Theorem 1] and Fainberg [7, Theorem 1]. Because of the changes in notation, a 
proof is provided here. 
Proposition 2.2. Let a be a strategy in f at x. Then there exists a probability triple 
(n, sI, J.L) and a collection of strategies {(Tw: WEn} in T at x satisfring 
a(B)= f O"w(B)dJ.L(w) forallBin9JJ"'. (2.1) 
Moreover, if a is a ~farkov strategy, then {O"w: WEn} can be chosen to be Markov. 
Proof. The argument will be provided for the case where ais Markov; the demonstra­
tion in the non-Markov case is essentially the same. Fix a Markov strategy a in t­
at x. and without loss of generality let X ={I, 2, 3, ...}. Enlarging the underlying 
probability space if necessary, embed the "state process" X = (Xl' X 2 , X J , ••• ) in 
a larger process (Xl, Y., X 2 • Y2 •••• ) where: the conditional distribution of Yi given 
XI, Y., ... , Y, - t , Xi is uniform on [0, I) (so the {Yj } are i.i.d. uniform [0, I), and 
Y, is independent of XI> ... , X,); and the conditional distribution of X, <I given 
X., Y1 , ••• , Xi, Yi is 'Y'.;.k on the set 
{Xi =J} (") {Yj E [a,.,.k" ai.i.dL 
where L;"'I Pi.i.k 'Yi.i.k is the gamble in r which CT uses if in state J at time i, and 
a i.i.k = Pi.i,l + ... + Pi.l.k· 
(Recall that both P',I.k > °and 'Yi.J,k E J'(j) for all i, J, k.) Observe that the distrihution 
of X in the embedded process is the same as the distribution of X under the strategy 
cT, that is, P(XE8)=cJ(8) for all LJE01', Since the random vectors X and 
Y =(Y1 , Y2 , ••• ) take values in Borel spaces, it follows [2, Theorem 4.34] that there 
exists a regular conditional distribution for X given Y. That is, there is a function 
0'1 ,,( • ) on [0, 1) ", x @" such that for fixed wE [0, l) X', u", ( , ) is a probability measure 
on (XC, @"), and for fixed 8 E 88 "', 0'(,)( 8) is a version of P(X E B I Y). Moreover, 
for each w there is a natural Markov strategy O'w in r at x associated with the 
measure 0'w; if W = (r, , r2 , ••• ) then o"w is the strategy which in state J at time i uses 
'Y,.J,,,Er(j), where k is determined by a,.i.,,_,~rJ<ai,i,'" Let n be [0, 1)"',:.1 the 
product-Borel sigma algebra, and J.L the product of countably many copies of 
Lebesgue measure on [0, 1). The conclusion (2.1) then follows, since 
cJ(8)=P(XEB)= f p(XE:BIY)dP}.= f 0'",(8)dJ.L(w). 0 
In contrast to the conclusion of Proposition 2.2 pertaining to Markov strategies, 
it is not always possible to write a stationary strategy in j'- as the average of stationary 
strategies in r 
Example 2.3. Let X == {a. b. c}; let r(a) == {c5(b), c5(c)}, and r(b) == r(c) == c5(a). Let 
a be the stationary strategy in f at b which uses (c5 (b) + e5 (c) )/2 always at state 
H a", and let B == {Xz == b and X~ == d. Then a( B) == Lbut a( B) == 0 for all (i.e. both) 
stationary strategies a in r at b. 
Proposition 2.4. Let a be a strategy in f at x, and let I :X x- -.!R be measluable and 
a-integrable (i.e. f II Ida < 00). Then there exist strategies a l and U~ in r at x with 
!vloreol'er, il a is Markov, then U 1 and Uz can be chosen to be Markov. 
Proof. By Proposition 2.2 there is a probability space (f1, s1, J1.) and a collection of 
(Markov) strategies {u,J in r at x satisfying (2.1). It then follows routinely (for 
indicator functions, then for simple functions, then for limits of simple functions) 
using the dominated convergence theorem that 
Since jJ. is a prohability measure, this even implies there is a set of w of positive 
J1.-measure for which f f drT", ?- f I dlT. 0 
An immediate corollary to Proposition 2.4 is that in decision processes with 
bounded payolTs j: one may do just as weU with non-randomized (pure) strategies 
as with randomized ones. 
Corollary 2.5. Let I: X'''' -!R be bounded and measurable. Then 
(i) sup{f Id,r: a in r at x} ==sup{f IdcT: a in t at X}, and 
( ii) in f{f 1 d IT: a in rat x } == in f{f 1 d IT: a in tat X }. 
Equality is not always attainable In the conclusion of Proposition 2.4, as the 
following easy example shows. 
Example 2.6. Let X == {a, b, d; let l'(a) == {B(b), c5(c)}, r(b) == {e5(b)}, and I'(c) == 
{B(c)}; and define 1 by l(x l , X2'" .) == I if Xl == b, and == 0 otherwise. If a is the 
stationary strategy in t at "a" given by aW)==(e5(b)+e5(c»/2, then f/da-==L but 
ffdlT==O or I for all a in l: 
3. Randomized Markov strategies 
Assume that (X, F) is a countable-state decision process. 
Definition 3.1. For each positive integer n, let rn be a non-negative real-valued 
function with domain X and let Y r be the collection of all strategies in r. Let "11'-1 
be the set of all functions WI: Y r -+ [-00, +00] = iR which are of the form 
and let "11"2 be the set of all functions w:: Y r -+ [ - 00, + 00] of the form 
w:(u) =g( E,,[r1(X.)], Eu[r.(XI)r:(X:)],.,., E"C~I 1j(Xj ) J. ...), 
where g is any function having domain (iR+)-X:' and taking values in iR. Let "'W. u '11-: 
be denoted by "W". 
Thus "11'1 consists of those payoff functions which depend only on expected 
one-stage rewards, while "'W: includes those payoffs which depend on successive 
expected product rewards. 
The following example lists some typical functions in 'W, both some standard 
dynamic programming objectives and several non-standard ones. 
Example 3.2. (a) total reward. Then WE "IV., where 
(In particular, if f3>O and r,,=f3 n - 1 r, then w(u) is "total discounted reward"; if 
'n =0 for n ~ N, w(u) is "total finite horizon reward",) 
(b) average reward. Then WE WI, where 
w(u) = li~c~p ~ E"Lt. r)(X) J. 
(c) exponential (product) reward. Then WE "IV., where 
w(u) = !~~ exp EtJ'[il rj(Xj )] = !~~ ill exp E,,[rj(Xj )]. 
(d) supremum reward. Then WE "IV., where 
w(u) =sup E"r"(X"). 
" 
(e) average periodic reward. Let p be a positive integer. Then WE "'WI, where 
(In particular, if p = I, then w(O") is "lim sup reward".) 
(f) expected product reward. Then w E 'Jr~, where 
w(O") =: li~!~p ECT [j0, rj(X)l' 
(In particular, if A c X and rn =: 1-\ for each n, then w( a-) is the probability of 
staying in A forever.) 
(g) maximum deviation. If p is a constant. then WE '11',. where 
w(a-) =: limsupl E.,[r,,(X,,)] - pl.
n--X' 
(h) maximum variation (in expected performance). Then WE '11'., where 
w(0") =: sup Ima x E..[ rJ ( X, )] - min E"[ rJ ( Xj ) I, 
n-X" J~" )~n 
Two objective functions which are not in 11' are the classical gambling-theoretic 
payoff w( a-) = E..[limsup" _ ,.r( X,,)], and the product reward payoff w( a-) = 
E..[r( Xl) . r( X~) . r( X.\)] for the case where r may take negative and positive values. 
The question of adequacy of Markov strategies for the gambling-theoretic payoff is 
answered aflirmatively, if X is finite. in Hill [10]; for the product reward problem, 
Markov strategies arc not in general adequate (Example 3.7 below). 
As preparation for the fundamental defInition of product-dependent randomized 
Markov strategy, some notation is needed. For each positive integer n, let r,,: X -Ill 
be a non-negative function and let IT be a strategy. If q = (x" X~, . .. ,x,,) is a sequence 
(or partial history) of length n in X, let ~«(T, q) denote the product 
r, (XI) r2(.~ 2) • • • r" (X" ) I~, ( .X', = X I , X 2 = X 2, • • • , X" = x" ). 
That is, 
~(IT, lJ) ::: ['1\ ',(x/) }T(0)( {XI}) 
x IT(X,)({X1})IT('\·IX1)({Xl})·· . £T(X IX2 ' .. x,,_,)({X,,}). 
It is easy to see that 
E.. [ ,(II '/(XI )] = ,}=x" ~ «(T, lJ)· 
Definition 3.3. The product-dependent randomi::ed Markov strategy for the strategy 
(T and the rewards r l , r1, r.\, ... is the strategy a constructed as follows: let (;(0) =: 
aWL and for each x in X, let (T(X) = u(x). For any partial history q of length n 
such that n> 1 and lJ" = x", let 
'>," ~(IT, px" ) (T ( pX" )
 
"" p' :\,. I
 
IT( q) =: :"---\,,-.-----­ if y ~(lr,px,,»O,
 





u(q) = u(x,,) if ~(u, px,,) = 0 for each p E X,,-I. 
Notice that the transition probability (gamble) that u uses at x" is a mixture of 
gambles that u uses at x", weighted with respect to the products ~(u, px"). The 
assumption that each 'j is non-negative guarantees that u(q) ~ O. In the case where 
~(u, px,,) =0 for each p E X"-t, the definition of u(q) is rather arbitrary; u(x,,) was 
chosen for convenience to ensure that u is Markov and in f. 
Remark. In the special case where '" == 1 for each n, the strategy u in Definition 
3.3 has the property that 
U(X"+IEGlx,,=x)=U(X"+IEGlx,,=x) (3.1) 
for each subset G of X, each positive integer n, and each x E X. Such a randomized 
Markov average u has been used often in the literature of dynamic programming. 
(For example, see Fainberg [7,8], or Strauch [19]). 
The product-dependent randomized Markov strategy u yields the same product 
reward as the original strategy u. as seen below: 
Proposition 3.4. If (T is a strategy, ',,: X -IR is a non-negative function for each n, 
and if cT is the product dependent randomized Markov strategy for (T and rl , ,!. r J ••••• 
then for each positive integer n, 
E" [(I rj ( Xj )] = E ,I' [(I r) ( X j )] • (3.2) 
)~ 1 I-I 
Proof. It follows from Definition 3.3 (since II" x" ~«(F. px,,) =0 if and only if eachI 
summand is zero) that for all n ~ 1, all x" E X, and all q E X" such that q" = x"' 
u(q) I ~(u, px,,) = I ~(u, px,,)a(px,,). (3.3 ) 
I' •.~X"-I pte.\''' I 
The plan is to show by induction that for all n ~ 2, 
I ~(a, q)u(q) = I ~(u, q)a(q). (3.4) 
qt:X"-1 C/t: ..,\"-I 
Then, evaluating each side of the measure equality (3.4) at (X" = xn), multiplying 
both sides by," (x,,), and summing over all x" in X, the desired equality (3.2) will 
be obtained for alLn ~ 2. 
To prove (3.4) for n =2, observe that for each x in X, 
~(u, x) = ,.(x)a(0)({x}) = 'l(x)o-(0)({x}) = ~(o-, x). 
For the induction step, calculate as follows: 
</.:Lx. ~«(T, q)u(q) = .~"~x [po:t--. ~(u, PX,,)U(PXn )] 
=~"~x [pC~_-1 ~(u, px")cJ(px")] 
using (3.3) and observing that 0-( px,,) does not depend on p. Then. with aid of the 
induction hypothesis, 
'1E~M ~(a. q)a(q) =~M~X r"(X"{PEtM_' ~(a, p)a(p)({x,,})o-(PX,,)] 
=~M~X r"(X"{p<:~M_' ~(a-'P)a-(P)({X,,})a-(PX,,)] 
= ~ ~(a-, q)o-(q), 
'I': x" 
and (3.4) is proved; the relation (3.2) follows, as long as n?: 2. For the case where 
n = I, (3.2) holds because o-(~)) =a(U). 0 
The following theorem, the main result in this section, guarantees the existence 
of good randomi::ed Markov strategies for all countable-state decision processes 
with objective function in cWo It will also serve as a stepping stone to Theorem 4.2, 
which asserts the existence of good non-randomi:ed Markov strategies for many of 
the objective functions in '1t·. 
Theorem 3.5. Let (X, r) he a cOlUltah/e-state decision process, and suppose IV E '11'. 
Then for cac" x E X ami each rT in r at x. t"ere is a randomi:ed Markov .'itrate~y /; 
in t at x wit" w( (I-) ~ w( (T). 
I)roof. Let x E X and let (T he in r at x. In case WE 'U"" let CT be the randomized 
Markov strategy described in the remark following Definition 3.3. The relation (3.1) 
guarantees that 
EAr" (X" )] = E" [ r" (X" )] (3.5) 
for each II?: I, and hence that w(rF) = w(rT), proving the theorem. In case wE 'U·~, 
let CT be the product-dependent randomized Markov strategy for (T and r l , r~, r\, .... 
The proof is completed by applying Proposition 3.4. 0 
Remarks. The portion of Theorem 3.5 which pertains to cJr l is a special case of 
results of Derman and Strauch [5, Theorem 2] and of Hordijk [11. Theorem 13.2]' 
In Delinition 3.1, each function r" was assumed non-negative, and in the case 
where W E 'JV~, the proof of Theorem 3.5 did use this assumption. However, in the 
case where WE 'WI' the only purpose of the hypothesis r" ?: 0 was to guarantee the 
existence of each expectation E,,[ r,,( X,,)]. Thus for the 'WI case, the non-negativity 
assumption on r" may be weakened. 
Actually, in the 'WI case, the proof of Theorem 3.5 depended only upon the fact 
that the distributions of X" under (T and (T are the same, and not upon the integrals 
in (3.5). Therefore its conclusion would hold for a much larger class than 'JV., 
specifically, objective functions which depend only on the distributions of the 
random variables, such as functions of the medians, supports, or variances. But for 
the application of this theorem in the proof of the existence of good non-randomized 
Markov strategies (Theorem 4.4), integration (via averages of probability measures 
and Fatou's Lemma) plays an important role. 
The 'Wt case of Theorem 3.5 could also be extended to reward functions of the 
form r"(X,,, X,,+I), since the distribution of (X", X"+I ) is the same under a as under 
the a described in (3.1). Even further, the reward could depend on the gamble or 
action as well. with rewards of the form r"(X", 'Y, X"+t). Such reward functions 
have been investigated before (cf. Ornstein [15] or Schal and Sudderth [18]). 
This section concludes with three examples of decision processes where the payoff 
functions are not in ,:OW, and where, in contrast to the setting of Theorem 3.5, there 
are non-Markov strategies in r which yield substantially larger payoffs than any 
Markov strategies in f. In the first example, the payoff is the expected maximum 
reward over times 1,2, and 3 (recall the maximum expected reward 3.2(d) is in lV). 
In the second example, the payoff is the product of rewards over times 1,2. and 3, 
but negative rewards are allowed. The third example shows that it is not possible 
to extend Theorem 3.5 to include payon functions w which can be written as a sum 
of two payoffs, one from 11~t and one from W~. 
Example 3.6. Let X={a,b,c,d,e}~ rl=r~='-l=r, where r(a)=r(c)=r(d)=O, 
r ( b) = 5, r( e) = 10; n a ) = 0<5 ( b ) + ~ /5 (c) l. r ( b) = r (c) = r (e ) = { (5 (d ) l. and r (d) = 
{/5(bL'Yl. where 'Y=.~8(e)+~8(a); and w(cr)=E,,[max{r(X1).r(X2).r(X.1)}). Let 
CT.., be any strategy in r at "a" which. when in state d at time 2. uses 'Y if XI = b 
and uses il(b) if XI = c. (That is. cT,,(b, d) = 'Y and cr..,(c, d) = (5(b». It is easily 
verified that w(cr,d = '~\ while for any Markov strategy (T in t at "a", w«(1-) =5. 
Example 3.7. Let X = {a, b. c, d, e.f}, and r l = r1 = '-1 = r, where r(a) = r(b) = r(eI) = 
r(e)=+I, and r(c)=r(f)=-1. Let r(a)=gD(b)+~o(c)}. l'(b)=J'(c)=r(e)= 
nf) = {J5(d)}, and J'(d) = {o(e), o(f)}. Define the expected product reward objec­
tive by W(iT) =E.,[r(Xd· r(X1)· r(X.1)] for (FE Y/" If CT" is a strategy in r at "a" 
such that er,,(b, d) = cS(e) and erA(£:, el) =o(f), then w(erA ) = + I, but for any Markov 
strategy a in l' at "a", w(u) = O. 
Example 3.8. Let (X, r) be as in Example 3.6, let r\ = r 2 = r~ = r-4 = r, where r(a) = 
r(c) =0, r(b) = r(d) = I, r(e) =5, and let w(a) = E,,[r(X1) • r(X1) . r(X3)] + 
E.,[r(X-4)]. A calculation shows that for the non-Markov strategy (TI' defined in 
Example 3.6, w(er,,) =L while for any Markov strategy a in t at "a", w(o-) ~ 1.5. 
If the reward functions r tl are non-negative, then the expected product reward 
objective w lies in 'W (Example 3.2(f», and by Theorem 3.5, good randomized 
Markov strategies do exist. It follows from Theorem 4.2 in the next section that 
even good non-randomized Markov strategies exist for such an objective. 
Denardo and Rothblum [4] use linear programming to compute optimal policies 
for problems which have exponential utility functions and which satisfy certain 
transience conditions. In [12] and [13], Kreps studies the existence of optimal 
(non-Markov) strategies in problems with finite action spaces and general objective 
functions and the existence of good strategies which are Markov or stationary with 
respect to certain attached "summary spaces". Furukawa and Iwamoto [9] prove 
the existence of e-optimal stationary strategies for decision problems which have 
multiplicative payoffs and which satisfy certain monotonicity and Lipschitz condi­
tions. The multiplicative payoff is also used by Rothblum in [16]. 
As pointed out in [9], the multiplicative payoff often arises naturally in problems 
where the objective is to maximize system reliability in a device with components 
10 senes. 
4. Existence of good Markov strategies in r 
The previous section established that if the objective function w lies inU' then 
for any strategy there is a randomized Markov strategy with an equivalent payotI. 
In this section, Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrate that for a large class of objective 
functions within "If", it is even possible to find a f1on-randomized Markov strategy 
whose payotI is at least as good as the payolf for the original strategy. For those 
objective functions in 'JV which are in 'WI, the conclusions of Theorems 4.1 and 
4.2 arc similar to those of theorems of Fainberg [8, Section 4]. It is assumed 
throughout that (X, 1') is a countable-state decision process. 
Theorem 4.1. If x E X, WE 'JV', and w is of the form 
w( (r) =f f d(T for some bounded, measurable f: X'-C' ... IR, (4.1 ) 
then for any strategy (rA in r at x there exist Markov strategies lrM afld (T~ in r at x 
such that w( lrM) ~ w( lrA) ~ w( lr~,). 
Proof. Suppose (TA is in r at x and wE'll". By Theorem 3.5, there is a randomized 
Markov strategy a. in t at x with w(o.) = w(aA). Using Proposition 2.4, there exists 
a Markov strategy lr,\, in r at x such that 
w(lr,\,) = f f d(rM ~ f fda. = w(o-) = w(aA)' 
The lr~, conclusion follows similarly. 0 
It was shown earlier (Theorem 3.5) that if w::1'/, -+ IR is in 'Jr, then for any strategy 
a there is a randomi:ed Markov strategy 0- with w(o-) =w(a). By imposing some 
convexity restrictions, the following key theorem is obtained, which asserts the 
existence of good non-randomized Markov strategies. (Of course, by enlarging the 
state space sufficiently, any problem can be transformed into one where even good 
"stationary" strategies always exist, but the essence of "stationary" and "Markov" 
for the original problem is lost under the transformation.) 
Theorem 4.2. Suppose rn : X -IR+ are bounded and gn : (IR+) -+ IR are cont'ex functions, 
and that w:Yr -+[ -00,00) is defined by w=limsup Gn, where 
(i) Gn(u) = gn( Eu[rl(X1)], ••• , E.,[rn(Xn )]), or 
(ii) Gn(u) = gn( Eu[r.(X. )], E(T[rl(XI)r~(X~)],... , EuL61 rj(Xj )J). 
For each x E X, if 
sup{Gn(u): n~l and u is in rat x}<oo, 
then for any strategy u A in r at x there is a (non-randomized) Markov strategy UM 
in r at x such that 
Proof. Let (1'" be in r at x. By Theorem 3.5, there is a randomized Markov strategy 
u in t at x such that w(u) = W«(TA ). Apply Proposition 2.2 to obtain a family {(T..,) 
of Markov strategies in r at x such that for all n, 
E,;[rn(X,,)] = f [f r,,(X,,) dlT,,, JdJL{w) 
and 
Then by the convexity of gn and by Jensen's inequality, it follows that 
G,,(a) ~ f Gn(u... ) dJL(w) 
for all n, Since sUP .... n{ Gn(a..,)} < 00, Fatou's Lemma applies, and 
w(a)=li';l:,~pGn(cT)~li';l:,~pf Gn(a... )dJ.L(w) 
~ f li';l':~p Gn(a..,) dJL(w) 
=f w(a..,) dJL(w). 
Since JL is a probability measure, the relation above guarantees that there exists W 
(in fact, a set of w's of positive measure) with 
W(CT..,);:!= w(a) = W(CTA). 0 
For x E X, let W(x) =sup{ W(17): 17 is in r at x}. A strategy 17Ao in r at x is optimal 
if W(17-\) = W(x); for e>O, 17Ao is E-optimal if W(17Ao ) > W(x)-e. The following 
corollary is immediate. 
Corollary 4.3. If the h.vpotheses of Theorem 4.2 are satisfied, then for each E > 0 and 
x E X, there is a Markov E-optimal strategy in rat x. Ifalso there is an optimal strategy 
in r at x, then there exists a AJarkov optimal strategy in r at x. 
Remarks. If one replaces "Iimsup" by "sup" in the definition of W in Theorem 4.2, 
the conclusion still holds; to see this, let h" =max j ", " gj' and observe that the h" are 
convex and that limsup h" = lim h" =sup g". 
The convexity assumption in Theorem 4.2 is not as restrictive as it might seem 
at first glance; observe that all the payoffs in Example 3.2 except (f) are of this 
form (in fact, in (a), (b). (d), and (e), the g" are even linear), 
If the functions 8" in the statement of Theorem 4.2 are not convex, there may be 
no Markov strategy 17,1\( for which w( 17,I\() ~ w( 17,,). Indeed, w( 17A ) could be strictly 
larger than the supremum of W«(TM) over Markov strategies 17M available at x, as 
the next example illustrates. 
Example 4.4. Let X ={a, h, c, d, r,f} and r" = r for each n, where r(e) = I and r =0 
otherwise. Let r(a)=n()(h)+~Ii(c)}, l'(h)=r(c)=r(e)=r(f)={8(d)}, and 
r(d) = {Ii(e), Ii(f)}. Deline w on ':f,. by 
I if E,,[r(X,)] =~,
 
w( (,) ==
 { o otherwise. 
In the notation of Theorem 4.2, the function K": 1Il" ..... 1Il (n ~ 3) is defined hy 
Il Y.\ =2, 
gIl (YI, ... ,)/,,) =G'f 
otherwise. 
Notice that g" is not convex, and that if (TA is a strategy in r at a which. satisfies 
aA(h, d) = Ii(e) and a,,(c, d) = 5(f), then w(17A) = 1. However, for any Markov 
strategy aM in r at a, E"" (X.\) = I or 0, so w( a,l\,) = O. (Of course, as Theorem 3.5 
implies, there does exist a randomi:ed Markov strategy (T in P at a such that 
W«(T) = I.) 
Practically no condition, including the convexity of the g" 's, is necessary for the 
conclusion of Theorem 4.2 to hold, as can be seen by looking at any decision process 
where r(x) has only one element for each x (so there is only one strategy, and that 
is even stationary) and an arbitrary payofI function. 
5. Good Markov strategies for the lim inf objective 
The results of the earlier sections will now be used to show that for the expected 
lim inf payon, it is possible to find Markov strategies which are nearly optimal. 
In the classical gambler's problem of Dubins and Savage [6], applied to the 




where u: X -.!R, the utility function, is bounded. 




and established sufficient conditions for the existence of good stationary strategies 
under such a payoff. In particular, he showed that if the state space X is finite and 
r(x) is finite for each x E X, then optimal stationary strategies ex-ist. In a general 
countable-state decision problem, however, good stationary strategies need not ex-ist 
for the expected lim inf objective, as can be seen by examining Example 3.9.2 of 
[6]. It is proved below that by allowing Markov strategies instead of only stationary 
ones, ncar-optimality can be achieved. 
Let (X, r) be a countable-state decision process and let u: X.-.!R be bounded. 
Define W: X .-.!R by 
W(x) =supf E,,[liminf u(X,,)]: (T is a strategy in r at x}. 
rt .'~' 
Theorem 5.1. For each F. > 0 and each x E X, there exists a MarkoL' .'itratc~y {T", in r 
at x such (hm 
E.,.~I[liminfu(X,,)] > W(x) - f-'. 
,. .• '''-J 
Proof. The theorem is easily reduced to the case where u is non-negative and takes 
only finitely many values. Next, let x EX, F. > 0, and u have values c. < C1 < ... < (',. 
Let 8 be F. or 
min{(j+,-(j: l~j~/-l}, 
whichever is smaller. Let a be a strategy in r at x such that 
. . 8£
E,,[hmlOf u(Xrt )] > W(x) --. (5.1 ) 
n-G 360 
According to Lemma 1 of Sudderth [20], W(x), W(X.}, W(X1), ••• IS a super­
martingale which converges a-almost surely, 
a[liminf u(X,,) > liminf W(Xn )] =0, (5.2) 
n .. ~J.'".' " ..... :0 
and 
W(X) ~ E,,[liminf W(Xn )] ~ E,,[liminf u(Xn )]. (5.3 ) 
"-,~ n-~ 
Use relations (5.l) and (5.3) to obtain 
E(j[liminf W(X") -liminf u(X")] <~. (5.4) 
"-~ "-x 36y 
Then by (5.2), (5.4), and Markov's inequality, 
u[liminf W(X") -liminf u(X") <~] > l-~. (5.5)
"-X' "-X' 6 6cI 
For each m ~ 1, let 
From (5.5), the almost-sure convergence of W(x), W(X.), W(X~). ... , and the 
assumption that u takes only finitely many values, there exists a positive integer N 
such that 
E 
u(DN » 1--. (5.6)3cI 
For each k. 1~ k ~ /, let 
and 
Bi' = {(XI, x~, ... ) E X"': for all n 3= N. x" E Ad. 
Notice that the sets {B:'} are disjoint and that 
(5.7) 
For each positive integer k, let ak be the product-dependent randomized Markov 




. (5.8)J,k - { I 
A" for} 3= N. 
Now define the randomized Markov strategy if in t at x as follows: if q is a 
partial history of length less than N, let 
and observe that for such q and for all}, a/q)=a1(q). Further, if q is a partial 
history of length m, where m ~ N, let 
Udq) if q",EAk , 
u(q) = u.(q){ if q", E X\( k~1 Ak ). 
(The definition of u( q) above is quite arbitrary in the case where q", does not lie 
in any of the sets A k .) With aid of (5.8) and Proposition 3.4, 
u(8;') = E,;['pi r;.dXj)] = E,;~[ ,n r;.k(Xj)] 
;=N	 ;=N 
= E,,[ ,fi rj.dx;)] = 0"( 8~) 
;=N 
for	 each k ~ 1. Then calculate: 
~ ~ E,,[liminf W( X,,)] _=-:> W(.d - e. 
,. -•. " 3 
(The next-lo-Iast inequality used (5.6) and (5.7), and the last inequality used (5.1) 
and (5.3).) 
Finally, use the ahove sequence of inequalities together with Proposition 2.4 to 
ohtain a (non-randomized) Markov strategy (T/\t in r at x which satislics the desired 
relation. 0 
If the state space X is finite, the conclusion of Theorem 5.1 is a special case of 
a result of Hill [10], who showed that if the functionj' in (4.1) is both shift-invariant 
and permutation-invariant, then good Markov strategies exist. 
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